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Abstract
An information–theoretic approach is proposed to watermark embedding and detection under
limited detector resources. First, we consider the attack-free scenario under which asymptotically op-
timal decision regions in the Neyman-Pearson sense are proposed, along with the optimal embedding
rule. Later, we explore the case of zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian covertext distribution with unknown
variance under the attack-free scenario. For this case, we propose a lower bound on the exponential
decay rate of the false-negative probability and prove that the optimal embedding and detecting
strategy is superior to the customary linear, additive embedding strategy in the exponential sense.
Finally, these results are extended to the case of memoryless attacks and general worst case attacks.
Optimal decision regions and embedding rules are offered, and the worst attack channel is identified.
1 Introduction
The field of information embedding and watermarking has become a very active field of research in the
last decade, both in the academic community and in the industry, due to the need of protecting the vast
amount of digital information available over the Internet and other data storage media and devices (see,
e.g.,[1]–[4]). Watermarking (WM) is a form of embedding information secretly in a host data set (e.g.,
image, audio signal, video, etc.). In this work, we raise and examine certain fundamental questions with
regard to customary methods of embedding and detection and suggest some new ideas for the most basic
setup.
Consider the system depicted in Fig. 1: Let x =
(
x1, . . . , xn
)
denote a covertext sequence emitted
from a memoryless source PX , and let u =
(
u1, . . . , un
)
denote a watermark sequence available at the
embedder and at the detector. Our work focuses on finding the optimal embedding and detection rules for
the following binary hypothesis problem: under hypothesis H1, the stegotext sequence y =
(
y1, . . . , yn
)
is “watermarked” using the embedder y = fn(x,u), while under H0, y = x, i.e, the stegotext sequence
in not “watermarked”. An attack channel Wn(z|y), fed by the stegotext, produces a forgery z, which in
turn, is observed by the detector. Now, given the forgery sequence z and the watermark sequence u, the
∗This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 223/05).
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detector needs to decide whether the forgery is “watermarked” or not. Performance is evaluated under the
Neyman-Pearson criterion, namely, minimum false detection probability while the false alarm probability
is kept lower than a prescribed level. The problem is addressed under different statistical assumptions:
the covertext distribution is known or unknown to the embedder/detector, the attack channel is known
to be a memoryless attack or it is a general attack channel, and the watermark sequence is deterministic
or random.
Embedder
DetectorAttackPSfrag replacements
x =
(
x1, x2, . . . , xn
)
u =
(
u1, u2, . . . , un
)
y z
Wn(z|y)
fn(x,u)
{
H0, H1
}H0
H1
Figure 1: The watermarking and detection problem.
Surprisingly, this problem did not receive much attention in the information theory community. In
[5], the problem of universal detection of messages via finite state channel was considered, and an optimal
decision rule was proposed for deciding whether the observed sequence is the product of an unknown finite-
state channel fed by one of two predefined sequences. Liu and Moulin [6],[7] explored the error exponent
of two popular one-bit WM systems: the spread-spectrum scheme and the quantized-index-modulation
(QIM) watermarking scheme, under a general additive attack. Bounds and closed form expressions were
offered for the error exponents. We note that the setting of [6] is different from ours: here, we are trying
to find the best embedder given detection resource under Neyman-Pearson criterion of optimality, while
in [6], the performance (the error exponent) of a given embedding schemes and a given source distribution
are evaluated under additive attacks. In [8], the problem of embedding/detection was formulated under
limited detection resources and the optimal decision region and the optimal embedding rule were offered
to the attack-free scenario.
Many researchers from the signal/image processing community (e.g., [2],[3],[9]– [13], [14, Sec.4.2] and
references therein) have devoted research efforts to explore the problem of optimal watermark embedding
and detection with one common assumption: the watermark embedding rule is normally taken to be
additive (linear), i.e., the stegotext vector y is given by
y = x+ γu (1)
2
or multiplicative, where each component of y is given by
yi = xi(1 + γui), i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
where in both cases, ui = ±1, and the choice of γ controls the tradeoff between quality of the stego-signal
(in terms of the distortion relative to the covertext signal x) and the detectability of the watermark - the
“signal–to–noise” ratio.
Once the linear embedder (1) is adopted, elementary detection theory tells us that the optimal
likelihood–ratio detector under the attack free scenario (i.e., z = y), assuming a zero–mean, Gaus-
sian, i.i.d. covertext distribution, is a correlation detector, which decides positively (H1: y = x + γu)
if the correlation,
∑n
i=1 uiyi, exceeds a certain threshold, and negatively (H0: y = x) otherwise. The
reason is that in this case, x simply plays the role of additive noise (the additive embedding scheme is,
in fact, the spread-spectrum modulation technique [15] in which the covertext is treated as an additive
noise). In a similar manner, the optimal test for the multiplicative embedder (2) is based on the different
variances of the yi’s corresponding to ui = +1 relative to those corresponding to ui = −1, the former
being σ2x(1 + γ)
2, and the latter being σ2x(1− γ)2, where σ2x is the variance of each component of x.
While in classical detection theory, the additivity (1), (or somewhat less commonly, the multiplicativity
(2)) of the noise is part of the channel model, and hence cannot be controlled, this is not quite the case in
watermark embedding, where one has, at least in principle, the freedom to design an arbitrary embedding
function y = fn(x,u), trading off the quality of y and the detectability of u. Clearly, for an arbitrary
choice of fn, the above described detectors are no longer optimal in general.
Malvar and Floreˆncio [16] have noticed that better performance can be gained if γ is chosen as
a function of the watermark and the covertext. However, their choice does not lead to the optimal
performance as will be shown later. Recently, Furon [17] explored the zero-bit watermark problem using
a different setting in which the watermark sequence is a function of the covertext and under a different
criterion of optimality.
While many papers in the literature addressed the problem of computing the performance of different
embedding and detection strategies and plotting their receiver operating characteristics (ROC) for differ-
ent values of the problem dimension n (see, e.g.,[11],[12],[18] and references therein), very few works [6],[7]
deal with the optimal asymptotic behavior of the two kinds of error probabilities, i.e., the exponential
decay rate of the two kind of the error probabilities as n tends to infinity.
The problem of finding the optimum watermark embedder fn for reliable WM detection is not trivial:
The probabilities of errors of the two kinds (false positive and false negative) corresponding to the
likelihood–ratio detector induced by a given fn, are, in general, hard to compute, and a–fortiori hard
to optimize in closed form. Moreover, obtaining closed form expressions for the optimal embedder and
decision regions when the covertext distribution is unknown is even harder (see Section 2 for more details).
Thus, instead of striving to seek the strictly optimum embedder, we take the following approach:
Suppose that one would like to limit the complexity of the detector by confining its decision to depend
on a given set of statistics computed from z and u. For example, the energy of z,
∑n
i=1 z
2
i , and the
correlation
∑n
i=1 uizi, which are the sufficient statistics used by the above described correlation detector.
Other possible statistics are those corresponding to the likelihood–ratio detector of (2), namely, the
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energies
∑
i: ui=+1
z2i , and
∑
i: ui=−1 z
2
i , and so on. Within the class of detectors based on a given set
of statistics, we present the optimal (in the Neyman-Pearson sense) embedder and its corresponding
detector for different settings of the problem.
First, we formulate the embedding and detection problem under the attack free scenario. We devise
an asymptotically optimal detector and embedding rule among all detectors which base their decisions
on the empirical joint distribution of z and u. This modeling assumption, where the detector has access
to a limited set of empirical statistics of u and z, has two motivations. First, it enables a fair comparison
(in terms of detection computational resources) to different embedding/detection methods reported in
the literature of WM in which most of the detectors use a similar set of statistics (mostly, correlation
and energy) to base their decisions. Second, this approach highlights the tradeoff between detection
complexity and performance: Extending the set of statistics on which the detector can base its decisions,
might improve the system performance, however, it increases the detector’s complexity.
Later, we discuss different aspects of the basic problem, namely, practical issues regarding the imple-
mentability of the embedder, universality w.r.t. the covertext distribution, other detector’s statistics, and
the case where the watermark sequence is random too. These results are obtained by extending the tech-
niques, presented in [5],[19]–[21], which are closely related to universal hypothesis testing problems. We
apply these results to a zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian covertext distribution with unknown variance. We pro-
pose a closed-form expression for the optimal embedder, and suggest a lower bound on the false-negative
probability error exponent. By analyzing the error exponent of the additive embedder and using the sug-
gested lower bound, we show that the optimal embedder is superior to the customary additive embedder
in the exponential sense. Finally, we extend these results to memoryless attack channels and worst-case
general attack channels. The worst-attack channel is identified and optimal embedding and detection
rules are offered. The model of general worst-case attack channels, treated here, was already considered
in the WM literature but in a different context. In [22], general attack channels were considered, where
the capacity and random-coding error exponent where derived for the private watermarking game under
general attack channels. In [23], the capacity of public watermark game under general attack channels
was derived for constant composition codes. This paper is a further development and an extension of [8],
[24] and it gives a detailed account for the results of [25].
2 Basic Derivation
We begin with some notation and definitions. Throughout this work, capital letters represent scalar
random variables (RVs) and specific realizations of them are denoted by the corresponding lowercase
letters. Random vectors of dimension n will be denoted by bold-face letters. The notation 1{A}, where
A is an event, will designate the indicator function of A (i.e.,1{A} = 1 if A occurs and 1{A} = 0
otherwise). We adopt the following conventions: The minimum (maximum) of a function over an empty
set is understood to be∞ (−∞). The notation an .= bn, for two positive sequences {an}n≥1 and {bn}n≥1,
expresses asymptotic equality in the logarithmic scale, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
(
an
bn
)
= 0.
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Let the vector Pˆx =
{
Pˆx(a), a ∈ X
}
denotes the empirical distribution induced by a vector x ∈ Xn,
where Pˆx(a) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 1{xi = a}. The type class T (x) is the set of vectors x˜ ∈ Xn such that Pˆx˜ = Pˆx.
Similarly, the joint empirical distribution induced by (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn is the vector:
Pˆxy =
{
Pˆxy(a, b), a ∈ X , b ∈ Y
}
, (3)
where
Pˆxy(a, b) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
{
xi = a, yi = b
}
, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , (4)
i.e., Pˆxy(a, b) is the relative frequency of the pair (a, b) along the pair sequence (x,y). Likewise, the type
class T (x,y) is the set of all pairs (x˜, y˜) ∈ Xn × Yn such that Pˆx˜y˜ = Pˆxy . The conditional type class
T (y|x), for given vectors x ∈ Xn, and y ∈ Yn is the set of all vectors y˜ ∈ Yn such that T (x, y˜) = T (x,y).
We denote by Eˆxy(·) expectation with respect to empirical joint distribution Pˆxy . The Kullback-Leibler
divergence between two distributions P and Q on A, where |A| <∞ is defined as
D(P‖Q) =
∑
a∈A
P (a) ln
P (a)
Q(a)
,
with the conventions that 0 ln 0 = 0, and p ln p0 = ∞ if p > 0. We denote the empirical entropy of a
vector x ∈ Xn by Hˆx(X), where
Hˆx(X) = −
∑
a∈X
Pˆx(a) ln Pˆx(a) .
Other information theoretic quantities governed by empirical distributions (e.g., conditional empirical
entropy, empirical mutual information) will be denoted similarly.
For two vectors, a, b ∈ Rn, the Euclidean inner product is defined as 〈a, b〉 = ∑ni=1 ai · bi and the
L2-norm of a vector is defined as ‖a‖ =
√〈a,a〉. Let Vol{A} denote the volume of a set A ⊂ IRn, i.e.,
Vol{A} = ∫A dx. We denote by sgn(·) the signum function, where sgn(x) = 1{x ≥ 0} − 1{x < 0}.
Throughout this paper, and without essential loss of generality, we assume that the components of x,
y, and z all take on values in the same finite alphabet A. In Section 4, the assumption that A is finite
will be dropped, and A will be allowed to be an infinite set, like the real line. The components of the
watermark u will always take on values in B = {−1,+1}, as mentioned earlier. Let us further assume
that x is drawn from a given memoryless source PX .
Throughout the sequel, until Section 5 (exclusively), we assume that there is no attack, i.e., the
channel Wn(z|y) is the identity channel:
Wn(z|y) =
{
1 , z = y
0 , else
.
This is referred to as the attack-free scenario. In this scenario, the detector will use y and u to base its
decisions.
For a given u ∈ Bn, we would like to devise a decision rule that partitions the space An of sequences
{y}, observed by the detector, into two complementary regions, Λ and Λc, such that for y ∈ Λ, we decide
in favor of H1 (watermark u is present) and for y ∈ Λc, we decide in favor of H0 (watermark absent:
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y = x). Consider the Neyman-Pearson criterion of minimizing the false negative probability
Pfn =
∑
x: fn(x,u)∈Λc
PX(x) (5)
subject to the following constraints:
(1) Given a certain distortion measure de(·, ·) and distortion level De, the distortion between x and y,
de(x,y) = de
(
x, fn(x,u)
)
, does not exceed nDe.
(2) The false positive probability is upper bounded by
Pfp
∆
=
∑
y∈Λ
PX(y) ≤ e−λn, (6)
where λ > 0 is a prescribed constant.
In other words, we would like to choose fn and Λ so as to minimize Pfn subject to a distortion constraint
and the constraint that the exponential decay rate of Pfp would be at least as large as λ.
Clearly, the problem is a classical hypothesis problem (under the Neyman-Pearson criterion of opti-
mality), with the following hypotheses: H0 : y = x (the covertext is not “marked”) and H1 : y = fn(x,u)
(the covertext is “marked”). Given fn and u, we can define the conditional distribution of y given the
two hypotheses:
P (y|H0) = PX(y) ,
P (y|H1) =
∑
x:fn(x,u)=y
PX(x) .
where PX(x) is the covertext distribution. The optimal test which minimizes the false-negative probability
under the Neyman-Pearson criterion of optimality is the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [26, p. 34]:
L(y) =
P (y|H1)
P (y|H0)
H1
>
<
H0
η
where η is chosen such that
Pfp
(
fn,u
)
=
∑
y:L(y)≥η
PX(y) = e
−nλ . (7)
Note that η is a function of λ, fn and u, therefore, we could not find a closed-form expression for η for
any general embedding rule and watermark sequence. The false-negative probability associated with the
above optimal test is given by
Pfn(fn, λ,u) =
∑
y:L(y)<η
∑
x:fn(x,u)=y
PX(x). (8)
Now, given a distortion level De measured using a distortion function de(·, ·), we would like to devise an
embedder fn which minimizes the false-negative probability while the distortion between the covertext x
and the stegotext y does not exceed nDe and the false-positive probability is kept lower than e
−nλ, i.e.,
f∗n = arg min
fn : de(x, fn(x,u)) ≤ nDe, ∀x
Pfp(fn,u) ≤ e−nλ
Pfn(fn, λ) . (9)
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The above general problem of finding the optimal embedding rule and detection regions is by no means
trivial. The fact that the probabilities of the two kinds of error cannot be expressed in a close form make
it very hard to solve this optimization problem and, as far as we know, there is no known solution for it.
Moreover, obtaining closed form expressions for the optimal embedder and decision regions when PX is
unknown is even harder.
We therefore make an additional assumption regarding the statistics employed by the detector. Sup-
pose that we limit ourselves to the class of all detectors which base their decisions on certain empirical
statistics associated with u and y, for example, the empirical joint distribution of y and u, i.e., Pˆuy .
Note that the requirement that the decision of the detector depends solely on Pˆuy means that Λ and Λ
c
are unions of conditional type classes of y given u.
It may seem, at a first glance, that the sequence u is superfluous in the definition of the problem,
since it is available to all legitimate parities. However, the presence of the watermark sequence u at
the detector provides the detector with a refined version of the statistics of its input (based on the joint
empirical statistics of y and u) and can be regarded as a secret key shared by both legitimate sides. This
additional information at the detector improves the overall performance of the system.
For a given λ > 0, define
Λ∗ =
{
y : lnPX(y) + nHˆuy(Y |U) + λn− |A| ln(n+ 1) ≤ 0
}
. (10)
The following theorem asserts that Λ∗ is asymptotically optimal decision region:
Theorem 1. (i) Pfp(Λ∗) ≤ e−n(λ−δn) where limn→∞ δn = 0.
(ii) For every Λ ⊆ An that satisfies Pfp(Λ) ≤ e−nλ′ for some λ′ > λ, we have Λc∗ ⊆ Λc for all sufficiently
large n.
In the above theorem it is argued that Λ∗ fulfills the false-positive constraint while minimizes the
false-negative probability, i.e., for any decision region Λ which fulfills the false-positive constraint and for
any embedding rule fn(x,u) the following holds
Pfn(Λ
c
∗) ≤ Pfn(Λc) . (11)
Proof. Let T (y|u) ⊆ Λ. Then, we have
e−λn ≥
∑
y′∈Λ
PX(y
′)
≥
∑
y′∈T (y|u)
PX(y
′)
≥ |T (y|u)| · PX(y)
≥ (n+ 1)−|A|enHˆuy(Y |U) · PX(y) , (12)
where the first inequality is by the assumed false positive constraint, the second inequality is since
T (y|u) ⊆ Λ, and the third inequality is due to the fact that all sequences within T (y|u) are equiprobable
under PX as they all have the same empirical distribution, which forms the sufficient statistics for the
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memoryless source PX . In the fourth inequality, we use the well known lower bound on the cardinality
of a conditional type class in terms of the empirical conditional entropy [27], defined as:
Hˆuy(Y |U) = −
∑
u,y
Pˆuy(u, y) ln Pˆuy(y|u) , (13)
where Pˆuy(y|u) is the empirical conditional probability of Y given U . We have actually shown that every
T (y|u) in Λ is also in Λ∗, in other words, if Λ satisfies the false positive constraint (6), it must be a subset
of Λ∗. This means that Λc∗ ⊆ Λc and so the probability of Λc∗ is smaller than the probability of Λc, i.e.,
Λc∗ minimizes Pfn among all Λ
c corresponding to detectors that satisfy (6). To establish the asymptotic
optimality of Λ∗, it remains to show that Λ∗ itself has a false positive exponent at least λ, which is very
easy to show using the techniques of [5, eq. (6)] and references therein. Therefore, we will not include
the proof of this fact here. Finally, note also that Λ∗ bases its decision solely on Pˆuy , as required.
While this solves the problem of the optimal detector for a given fn, we still have to specify the
optimal embedder f∗n. Defining Γ
c
∗(fn) to be the inverse image of Λ
c
∗ given u, i.e.,
Γc∗(fn) =
{
x : fn(x,u) ∈ Λc∗
}
=
{
x : lnPX(fn(x,u)) + nHˆu,fn(x,u)(Y |U) + λn− |A| ln(n+ 1) > 0
}
, (14)
then following eq. (5), Pfn can be expressed as
Pfn =
∑
x∈Γc∗(fn)
PX(x). (15)
Consider now the following embedder:
f∗n(x,u) = argminy: de(x,y)≤nDe
[
lnPX(y) + nHˆuy(Y |U)
]
, (16)
where ties are resolved in an arbitrary fashion. Then, it is clear by definition, that Γc∗(f
∗
n) ⊆ Γc∗(fn) for
any other competing fn that satisfies the distortion constraint, and thus f
∗
n minimizes Pfn subject to the
constraints.
3 Discussion
In this section, we pause to discuss a few important aspects of our basic results, as well as possible
modifications that might be of theoretical and practical interest.
3.1 Implementability of the Embedder (16)
The first impression might be that the minimization in (16) is prohibitively complex as it appears to
require an exhaustive search over the sphere {y : de(x,y) ≤ nDe}, whose complexity is exponential in
n. A closer look, however, reveals that the situation is not that bad. Note that for a memoryless source
PX ,
lnPX(y) = −n
[
Hˆy(Y ) +D(Pˆy‖PX)
]
, (17)
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where Hˆy(Y ) is the empirical entropy of y and D(Pˆy‖PX) is the divergence between the empirical
distribution of y, Pˆy , and the source PX . Moreover, if de(·, ·) is an additive distortion measure, i.e.,
de(x,y) =
∑n
i=1 de(xi, yi), then de(x,y)/n can be represented as the expected distortion with respect
to the empirical distribution of x and y, Pˆxy . Thus, the minimization in (16) becomes equivalent
to maximizing [Iˆuy(U ;Y ) + D(Pˆy‖PX)] subject to Eˆxyde(X,Y ) ≤ De, where Iˆuy(U ;Y ) denotes the
empirical mutual information induced by the joint empirical distribution Pˆuy and Eˆxy denotes the
aforementioned expectation with respect to Pˆxy . Now, observe that for given x and u, both [Iˆuy(U ;Y )+
D(Pˆy‖PX)] and Eˆxyde(X,Y ) ≤ De depend on y only via its conditional type class given (x,u), namely,
the conditional empirical distribution Pˆuxy(y|x, u). Once the optimal Pˆuxy(y|x, u) has been found,
it does not matter which vector y is chosen from the corresponding conditional type class T (y|x,u).
Therefore, the optimization across n–vectors in (16) boils down to optimization over empirical conditional
distributions, and since the total number of empirical conditional distributions of n–vectors increases only
polynomially with n, the search complexity reduces from exponential to polynomial as well. In practice,
one may not perform such an exhaustive search over the discrete set of empirical distributions, but apply
an optimization procedure in the continuous space of conditional distributions {P (y|x, u)} (and then
approximate the solution by the closest feasible empirical distribution). At any rate, this optimization
procedure is carried out in a space of fixed dimension, that does not grow with n.
3.2 Universality in the Covertext Distribution
Thus far we have assumed that the distribution PX is known. In practice, even if it is fine to assume a
certain model class, like the model of a memoryless source, the assumption that the exact parameters of
PX are known is rather questionable. Suppose then that PX is known to be memoryless but is otherwise
unknown. How should we modify our results? First observe, that it would then make sense to insist on
the constraint (6) for every memoryless source, to be on the safe side. In other words, eq. (6) would be
replaced by
max
PX
∑
y∈Λ
PX(y) ≤ e−λn , (18)
where the maximization over PX is across all memoryless sources with alphabet A. It is then easy to see
that our earlier derivation goes through as before except that PX(y) should be replaced by maxPX PX(y)
in all places (see also [5]). Since lnmaxPX PX(y) = −nHˆy(Y ), this means that the modified version
of Λ∗ compares the empirical mutual information Iˆuy(U ;Y ) to the threshold λn − |A| ln(n + 1) (the
divergence term now disappears). By the same token, and in light of the discussion in the previous
paragraph, the modified version of the optimal embedder (16) maximizes Iˆuy(U ;Y ) subject to the
distortion constraint. Both the embedding rule and the detection rule are then based on the idea of
maximum mutual information, which is intuitively appealing. For more on this idea and its use as a
universal decoding rule see [27, Sec. 2.5].
3.3 Other Detector Statistics
In the previous section, we focused on the class of detectors that base their decision on the empirical
joint distribution of pairs of letters {(u, y)}. What about classes of detectors that base their decisions
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on larger (and more refined) sets of statistics? It turns out that such extensions are possible as long as
we are able to assess the cardinality of the corresponding conditional type class. For example, suppose
that the stegotext is suspected to undergo a desynchronization attack that cyclically shifts the data by k
positions, where k lies in some uncertainty region, say, {−K,−K+1, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . ,K}. Then, it would
make sense to allow the detector depend on the joint distribution of 2K+2 vectors: y, u, and all the 2K
corresponding cyclic shifts of u. Our earlier analysis will carry over provided that the above definition of
Hˆuy(Y |U) would be replaced the conditional empirical entropy of y given u and all its cyclic shifts. This
is different from the exhaustive search (ES) approach (see, e.g., [28]) to confront such desynchronization
attacks. Note, however, that this works as long as K is fixed and does not grow with n.
3.4 Random Watermarks
Thus far, our model assumption was that x emerges from a probabilistic source PX , whereas the water-
mark u is fixed, and hence can be thought of as being deterministic. Another possible setting assumes
that u is random as well, in particular, being drawn from another source PU , independently of x, nor-
mally, the binary symmetric source (BSS). This situation may arise, for example, when security is an
issue and then the watermark is encrypted. In such a case, the randomness of u is induced by the
randomness of the key. Here, the decision regions Λ and Λc will be defined as subsets of An × Bn and
the probabilities of errors Pfn and Pfp will be defined, of course, as the corresponding summations of
products PX(x)PU (u). The fact that u is emitted from a memoryless source with a known distribution,
makes this model weaker compared to the model treated above in which u is an individual sequence.
Although this model is somewhat weaker, it can be analyzed for more general classes of detectors. This
is because the role of the conditional type class T (y|u) would be replaced by the joint type class T (u,y),
namely, the set of all pairs of sequences {(u′,y′)} that have the same empirical distribution as (u,y) (as
opposed to the conditional type class which is defined as the set of all such y’s for a given u). Thus, the
corresponding version of Λ∗ would be
Λ∗ =
{
(u,y) : lnPX(y) + lnPU (u) + nHˆuy(U, Y ) + λn− |A| ln(n+ 1) ≤ 0
}
, (19)
where Hˆuy(U, Y ) is the empirical joint entropy induced by (u,y), and the derivation of the optimal
embedder is accordingly.1 The advantage of this model, albeit somewhat weaker, is that it is easier to
assess |T (u,y)| in more general situations than it is for |T (y|u)|. For example, if x is a first order Markov
source, rather than i.i.d., and one is then naturally interested in the statistics formed by the frequency
counts of triples {ui = u, yi = y, yi−1 = y′}, then there is no known expression for the cardinality of
the corresponding conditional type class, but it is still possible to assess the size of the joint type class
in terms of the empirical first-order Markov entropy of the pairs {(ui, yi)}. Another example for the
differences between random watermark and deterministic watermark can be seen in Section 6.
It should be also pointed out that once u is assumed random (say, drawn from a BSS), it is possible
to devise a decision rule that is asymptotically optimum for an individual covertext sequence, i.e., to drop
the assumption that x emerges from a probabilistic source of a known model. The resulting decision
1Note that in the universal case (where both PX and PU are unknown), this leads again to the same empirical mutual
information detector as before.
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rule, obtained using a similar technique, accepts H1 whenever Hˆuy(U |Y ) ≤ 1 − λ, and the embedder
minimizes Hˆuy(U |Y ) subject to the distortion constraint accordingly.
4 Continuous Alphabet – the Gaussian Case
In the previous sections, we considered, for convenience, the simple case where the components of both
x and y take on values in a finite alphabet. It is more common and more natural, however, to model
x and y as vectors in IRn. Beyond the fact that, summations should be replaced by integrals, in the
analysis of the previous section, this requires, in general, an extension of the method of types [27], used
above, to vectors with real–valued components (see, e.g., [29],[30],[31]). In a nutshell, a conditional type
class, in such a case, is the set of all y–vectors in IRn whose joint sufficient statistics with u have (within
infinitesimally small tolerance) prescribed values, and to have a parallel analysis to that of the previous
section, we have to be able to assess the exponential order of the volume of the conditional type class.
Suppose that x is a zero–mean Gaussian vector whose covariance matrix is σ2I, I being the n × n
identity matrix, and σ2 is unknown (cf. Subsection 3.2). Let us suppose also that the statistics to be
employed by the detector are the energy of
∑n
i=1 y
2
i and the correlation
∑n
i=1 uiyi. These assumptions are
the same as in many theoretical papers in the literature of watermark detection. Then, the conditional
empirical entropy Hˆuy(Y |U) should be replaced by the empirical differential entropy hˆuy(Y |U), given
by [30]:
hˆuy(Y |U) = 1
2
ln
[
2πe ·min
β
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − βui)2
)]
=
1
2
ln
[
2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
y2i −
( 1n
∑n
i=1 uiyi)
2
1
n
∑n
i=1 u
2
i
)]
=
1
2
ln
[
2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
y2i − (
1
n
n∑
i=1
uiyi)
2
)]
. (20)
The justification of eq. (20) is as follows: For a given ǫ > 0 define the set
Tǫ(y|u) =
{
y˜ ∈ Rn :
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
y2i −
n∑
i=1
y˜2i
∣∣∣ ≤ nǫ, ∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
yiui −
n∑
i=1
y˜iui
∣∣∣ ≤ nǫ
}
. (21)
Similarly as in Lemma 3 [30], it can be shown that
lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
[
Vol
{
Tǫ(y|u)
}]
= hˆuy(Y |U) . (22)
To see this, define an auxiliary channel y = βu + z, where z ∼ N (0, σ2zI) (this channel is used only
to evaluate Vol {Tǫ(y|u)} and is not related to the actual distribution of y given u, see [30, p. 1262]).
By tuning the parameters β and σ2z such that the expectations of
1
n
∑n
i=1 y
2
i and
1
n
∑n
i=1 yiui would
be 1n
∑n
i=1 y˜
2
i and
1
n
∑n
i=1 y˜iui, respectively, the set Tǫ(y|u) has a high probability under the auxiliary
channel given u. Moreover, any two vectors in Tǫ(y|u) have conditional pdf’s which are exponentially
equivalent. Accordingly, using the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 3 in [30, p. 1268] (which is
based on these observation) we derive an upper and a lower bound on Vol
{
Tǫ(y|u)
}
. These bounds are
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identical in the logarithmic scale, and so,
Vol
{
Tǫ(y|u)
} .
= e
n
[
hˆuy(Y |U)+∆(ǫ)
]
, (23)
and limǫ→0∆(ǫ) = 0.
Note that the order in which the limits are taken in (22) is important: We first take the dimension
n to infinity, and only then we take ǫ to zero. Mathematically speaking, if ǫ goes to zero for a finite
dimension n the volume of Tǫ(y|u) equals zero. The order of the limits has a practical meaning too. The
fact that ǫ is positive for any given dimension means that the detector can calculate the correlation and
energy with limited precision. In the absence of such a realistic limitation, one can offer an embedding
rule (under the attack-free case and for continuous alphabet) with zero false-negative and false-positive
probabilities by designing an embedder with a range having measure zero 2. This additional limitation
that we implicitly impose on the detector, is very natural and it exists in every practical system.
Using the same technique used to evaluate hˆuy(Y |U) in (20), it can easily be shown that
lim
ǫ→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
[
Vol{Tǫ(y)}
]
=
1
2
ln
(
2πe · 1
n
n∑
i=1
y2i
)
△
= hˆy(Y ) , (24)
where
Tǫ(y) =
{
y˜ ∈ Rn : |
n∑
i=1
y2i −
n∑
i=1
y˜2i | ≤ nǫ
}
. (25)
Therefore, the optimal embedder maximizes
Iˆuy(U ;Y ) = −1
2
ln
(
1− (
1
n
∑n
i=1 uiyi)
2
1
n
∑n
i=1 y
2
i
)
. (26)
or, equivalently, 3 maximizes
R(u,y)
△
=
〈u,y〉2
‖y‖2 (27)
subject to the distortion constraint, which in this case, will naturally be taken to be Euclidean,
∑n
i=1(xi−
yi)
2 ≤ nDe. While our discussion in Subsection 3.1, regarding optimization over conditional distributions,
does not apply directly to the continuous case considered here, it can still be represented as optimization
over a finite dimensional space whose dimension is fixed, independently of n. In fact, this fixed dimension
is 2, as is implied by the next lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal embedding rule under the above setting has the following form:
f∗n(x,u) = ax+ bu. (28)
2E.g., the spread-transform dither modulation (STDM) embedder proposed in [32, Sec. V.B] achieves zero false-negative
probability under the attack-free scenario because the embedder range has measure zero. We thank M. Barni for drawing
our attention to this fact.
3Note also that the corresponding detector, which compares Iˆuy(U ; Y ) to a threshold, is equivalent to a correlation
detector, which compares the (absolute) correlation to a threshold that depends on the energy of y, rather than a fixed
threshold (see, e.g., [28]).
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Proof. Clearly, every y ∈ IRn can be represented as y = ax + bu + z, where a and b are real valued
coefficients and z is orthogonal to both x and u (i.e., 〈u, z〉 = 〈x, z〉 = 0). Now, for any given y =
ax+ bu+ z such that z 6= 0, the vector projected onto the subspace spanned by x and u, y˜ = ax+ bu,
achieves a higher squared normalized correlation w.r.t. u than the vector y. To see this, consider the
following chain of inequalities:
R(u,y) =
〈u,y〉2
‖y‖2
=
〈u, ax+ bu+ z〉2
〈ax+ bu+ z, ax+ bu+ z〉
=
〈u, ax+ bu〉2
‖ax+ bu‖2 + ‖z‖2
≤ R(u, y˜) . (29)
In addition, if y fulfills the distortion constraint, then so does the projected vector y˜, i.e.,
‖y − x‖2 = ‖(a− 1)x+ bu+ z‖2
= ‖(a− 1)x+ bu‖2 + ‖z‖2
≥ ‖(a− 1)x+ bu‖2
= ‖y˜ − x‖2 . (30)
Therefore, the optimal embedder must have the form y = ax + bu. In summary, given any y that
satisfies the distortion constraint, by projecting y onto the subspace spanned by x and u, we improve
the correlation without violating the distortion constraint.
Upon manipulating this optimization problem, by taking advantage of its special structure, one can
further reduce its dimensionality and transform it into a search over one parameter only (the details are
in Subsection 4.1).
Going back to the opening discussion in the Introduction, at first glance, this seems to be very close
to the linear embedder (1) that is so customarily used (with one additional degree of freedom allowing
also scaling of x). A closer look, however, reveals that this is not quite the case because the optimal
values of a and b depend here on x and u (via the joint statistics
∑n
i=1 x
2
i and
∑n
i=1 uixi) rather than
being fixed. Therefore, this is not a linear embedder.
4.1 Explicit Derivation of the Optimal Embedder
In this subsection, we present a closed-form expression for the optimal embedder. As was shown in the
previous section, the following optimization problem should be solved:
max
[(
1
n
∑n
i=1 yiui
)2
1
n
∑n
i=1 y
2
i
]
.
subject to:
n∑
i=1
(yi − xi)2 ≤ nDe (31)
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Substituting y = ax+ bu in eq. (31), gives:
max
a,b∈R
[
a2ρ2 + 2abρ+ b2
a2α2 + 2abρ+ b2
]
subject to: (a− 1)2α2 + 2(a− 1)bρ+ b2 ≤ D (32)
where α2
△
= 1n
∑n
i=1 x
2
i and ρ
△
= 1n
∑n
i=1 xiui. Note that α
2 ≥ ρ2 by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Theorem 2. The optimal values of (a, b) are:
• If De ≥ α2 − ρ2:
a∗ = 0 ; b∗ = ρ+
√
ρ2 − α2 +D (33)
• If De < α2 − ρ2:
a∗ = argmax
{
t(a)
∣∣ a ∈ {a1, a2, a3, a4}⋂R}
b∗ = a∗ · t(a∗) (34)
where
t(a) =
(1 − a)ρ+ sgn(ρ)√De − (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)
a
R =
[
1−
√
De
α2 − ρ2 , 1 +
√
De
α2 − ρ2
]
, (35)
(36)
and
a1,2 =
(α2 − ρ2)(α2 −De)±
√
Dρ2
√
(α2 − ρ2)(α2 −De)
α2(α2 − ρ2)
a3,4 = 1±
√
De
α2 − ρ2 . (37)
The proof is purely technical and therefore is deferred to the Appendix. We note that in the case
where De ≪ α2−ρ2, the value of a∗ tends to 1, and the value of b∗ tends to sgn(ρ)
√
De. Hence, the linear
embedder is not optimal even in the case where De ≪ α2. We will next use the above values to devise
a lower bound on the exponential decay rate of the false-negative probability of the optimal embedder,
and then compare it to an upper bound on the false negative exponent of the linear embedder.
4.2 Lower Bound to the False Negative Error Exponent of the Optimal Em-
bedder
Since the calculation of the exact false-negative exponent of the optimal optimal embedder is highly
non-trivial, in this subsection we derive a lower-bound on this exponent. Later, we show that even this
lower bound is by far larger than the exponent of the false-negative probability of the additive embedder.
Therefore, the additive embedder is sub-optimal in terms of the exponential decay rate of its false negative
probability.
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The lower bound will be obtained by exploring the performance of a sub-optimal embedder of the
form y = x + sgn(ρ)
√
Deu, which we name the sign embedder. This embedder is obtained by setting
a = 1 in (28)(note that this value is in the allowable range R of a). We assume that X ∼ N (0, σ2I).
First, we calculate a threshold value T which always guarantees a false-positive exponent not smaller
than λ. Using the proposed detector (26), the false-positive probability can be expressed as
Pfp = Pr
{
Iˆuy(U ;Y ) > T
∣∣ H0} = Pr{ρˆ2uy > 1− e−2T ∣∣ H0}
= 2Pr
{
ρˆuy >
√
1− e−2T ∣∣ H0}
where ρˆuy =
〈u,y〉
‖u‖·‖y‖ is the normalized correlation between u and y. Because under H0 Y = X, and
because of the radial symmetry of the pdf of X, we can conclude that for large n [33, p. 295]:
Pfp =
2An(θ)
An(π)
.
= en ln(sin θ) ,
where An(θ)
4 is the surface area of the n-dimensional spherical cap cut from a unit sphere about the
origin by a right circular cone of half angle θ = arccos
(√
1− e−2T ) (0 < θ ≤ π/2). Since we required
that Pfp ≤ e−nλ, then ln(sin θ) must not exceed −λ, which means that
− λ ≥ ln(sin θ)
T ≥ −1
2
ln
[
1− cos2 (arcsin(e−λ))] = λ , (38)
where the last equality was obtained using the fact that cos
(
arcsin(x)
)
=
√
1− x2. Hence, setting T = λ
ensures a false positive probability not greater than e−nλ for large n. Define the false-negative exponent
of the sign embedder
Esefn
△
= lim
n→∞
− 1
n
lnPfn (39)
where the false-negative probability is given by
Pfn = Pr
{
Iˆuy(U ;Y ) ≤ λ
∣∣ H1} = Pr{ρˆ2uy ≤ 1− e−2λ ∣∣ H1}. (40)
Theorem 3. The false-negative exponent of the sign embedder is given by
Esefn(λ,De) =
{
0 , Dee
−2λ
1−e−2λ ≤ σ2
1
2
[
Dee
−2λ
σ2(1−e−2λ) − ln
(
Dee
−2λ
σ2(1−e−2λ)
)
− 1
]
, else
(41)
The proof, which is mainly technical, is deferred to the Appendix. Let us explore some of the
properties of Esefn(λ,De). First, it is clear that E
se
fn(0, De) = ∞ (the detector output is constantly H1)
since ρˆ2uy ≥ 0. In addition, Esefn(λ, 0) = 0 (y = x and therefore does not contain any information on u).
For a given De, E
se
fn(λ,De) = 0 for λ ≥ 12 ln
(
1 + Deσ2
)
.
The exact value of the optimal exponent achieved when the optimal embedder is employed is too
involved to calculate. However, we can use some of the properties of the optimal embedder to improve
the lower bound on the optimal exponent. According to Theorem 2, in the case where De ≥ α2 − ρ2,
4It is well-known [33, p. 293] that An(θ) =
(n−1)pi(n−1)/2
Γ(n2 )
R θ
0 sin
(n−2)(ϕ)dϕ and An(pi) = 2An(pi/2).
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the optimal embedder can completely “erase” the covertext and therefore achieves a zero false negative
probability. We use this property to improve the performance by introducing sub-optimum embedder
which outperforms the sign embedder. Since De ≥ α2 ≥ α2−ρ2, the following embedding rule is obtained:
y = ax+ bu where
(a, b) =
{
(0, ρ+
√
ρ2 − α2 +De) , De ≥ α2
(1, sgn(ρ)
√
De) , else
. (42)
This embedder, which is an improved version of the sign embedder (but still sub-optimal), erases the
covertext in the cases where De ≥ α2 (to keep the embedding rule a function of one parameter, we chose
to “erase” the covertext only if De ≥ α2). Its performance is presented in the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. For λ > 12 ln 2, the false negative exponent of the improved sign embedder is given by:
E(λ,De) =
{
0 , De ≤ σ2
1
2
[
De
σ2 − ln
(
De
σ2
)− 1] , else ; (43)
otherwise, the false-negative exponent equals to Esefn(λ,De).
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. The fact that the optimal embedder can offer a positive false-
negative exponent for every value of λ is not surprising due to its ability to erase the covertext, which
leads to zero probability of false-negative. Although the improved sign embedder can offer a tighter lower
bound, the improvement is made only in the case where De ≥ σ2 (though it is not known a priori to the
embedder). Nevertheless, it emphasizes the true potential of the optimal embedder and the fact that the
sign embedder is truly inferior to the optimal embedder. In Figure 2, the false negative exponent of the
sign embedder and the false negative exponent of the improved embedder are plotted as functions of λ
for a given values of De and σ. The point where the two graphs break apart is λ =
1
2 ln(2). From this
point on, the improved sign embedder achieves a fixed value of 0.5(De/σ
2 − ln(De/σ2)− 1).
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Figure 2: Error exponents of the sign embedder and its improved version for σ2 = 1 and De = 2.
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4.3 Comparison to the Additive Embedder
Our next goal is to calculate the exponent of the false-negative probability of the linear additive embedder
y = x+
√
Deu, where a normalized correlation detector is employed. Again, we first calculate a threshold
value used by the detector which ensures a false-positive probability not greater than e−nλ. The false
positive probability is given by
Pfp = Pr
{
ρˆuy > T
∣∣H0} = Pr
{ 〈u,x〉
‖u‖ · ‖x‖ > T
}
=
An(θ)
An(π)
.
= en ln(sin θ) , (44)
where θ = arccos(T ) (0 < θ ≤ π/2). The second equality is due to the fact that under H0 Y = X, and
the third equality is again, due to the radial symmetry of the pdf of X. Then, ln(sin θ) ≤ −λ implies:
T ≥ cos
[
arcsin
(
e−λ
)]
=
√
1− e−2λ , (45)
and therefore, letting T =
√
1− e−2λ ensures a false-positive probability exponentially not greater than
e−nλ. Note that λ ≥ 0 implies that T must be non-negative. Define
Ψ1(r)
△
= arccos
[√
De(T
2 − 1) + T√r −De(1− T 2)√
r
]
(46)
and define the false-negative exponent of the additive embedder
Eaefn
△
= lim
n→∞−
1
n
lnPfn, (47)
where the false-negative probability is given by
Pfn = Pr
{
ρˆuy ≤
√
1− e−2λ∣∣H1} . (48)
Theorem 4. The false negative exponent of the additive embedder is given by
Eaefn(λ,De) = min
{
E1(λ,De), E2(λ,De)
}
(49)
where,
E1(λ,De) = min
Dee−2λ<r≤Dee−2λ
1−e−2λ
1
2
[
r
σ2
− ln
( r
σ2
)
− 2 ln sin (Ψ1(r)) − 1
]
E2(λ,De) =
{
0 , Dee
−2λ
1−e−2λ ≤ σ2
1
2
[
Dee
−2λ
(1−e−2λ)σ2 − ln
(
Dee
−2λ
(1−e−2λ)σ2
)
− 1
]
, else
(50)
Eaefn(λ,De) < E
se
fn(λ,De) for
Dee
−2λ
1−e−2λ > σ
2 and
Let us examine some of the properties of Eaefn(λ,De). It is easy to see that E
ae
fn(λ,De) ≤ E2(λ,De) =
Esefn(λ,De), i.e., the upper bound on the additive embedder exponent serves as a lower bound on the
optimal-embedder exponent. It is clear that Eaefn(λ, 0) = 0 since E
ae
fn(λ, 0) ≤ Esefn(λ, 0) = 0. In contrast
to the sign embedder, it turns out that Eaefn(0, De) <∞. To see why this is the case let us look at
E1(0, De) = min
r>De
f(r) (51)
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where f(r) = 12
[
r
σ2 − ln
(
r
σ2
)− 2 ln sin (Ψ1(r)) − 1]. Now, since f(r) is finite for r > De, the minimum
value of f(r) must be finite too. This is the case where the threshold value equals to zero and the
probability that there is an embedded vector Y with negative correlation to u is not zero. Clearly, for a
given De, E
ae
fn(λ,De) = 0 for λ ≥ 12 ln
(
1 + Deσ2
)
. Numerical calculations show that this happens even for
smaller values of λ, however, the exact smallest value of λ for which Eaefn(λ,De) = 0 is hard to find. In
Figures 3, 4 and 5 we compare the two embedding strategies by plotting their exponents as a functions
of σ2/De.
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Figure 3: Error exponents of the two embedding strategies (σ2/D = .1)
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Figure 4: Error exponents of the two embedding strategies (σ2/D = 1)
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Figure 5: Error exponents of the two embedding strategies (σ2/D = 10)
4.4 Discussion
When we take a closer look at the results, the fact the sign embedder achieves a better performance should
not surprise us. Clearly, when the correlation between x and u is non-negative, the additive embedder
and the sign embedder achieve the same performance. However, when the correlation between x and u
is negative (this happens in probability 1/2 due to the radial symmetry of the pdf of the covertext) this
is not true anymore. In this case, the additive embedder tries to maximize the correlation ρ between the
covertext x and the watermark u (while the detector compares the normalized correlation ρˆyu between
y and u to a given threshold), however, these efforts are turned to the wrong direction. Contrary to the
additive embedding scheme, the sign embedder tries to maximize the absolute value of the correlation
ρ while the detector compares the absolute value of the normalized correlation to a given threshold. In
this case, the sign embedder tries to minimize the correlation ρ. This difference is best exemplified in the
case where λ = 0. In this case, the sign embedder achieves Esefn(0, De) = ∞ while Eaefn(0, De) is finite
since the probability of embedded vectors Y for which ρˆyu < 0 is not zero.
We note that although the sign embedder is suboptimal, it achieves a much better performance than
the additive embedder with a slight increase in its complexity which is due to the calculation of sgn(ρ).
5 Attacks
Let us now extend the setup to include attacks. We first discuss attacks in general and then confine our
attention to memoryless attacks. In Section 6, we will discuss general worst-case attacks.
The case of attack is characterized by the fact that the input to the detector is no longer the vector
y as before, but another vector, z = (z1, . . . , zn), that is the output of a channel fed by y, which we shall
denote by Wn(z|y) as is shown in Fig. 1. For convenience, we will assume that the components of z take
on values in the same alphabet A, which will be assumed again to be finite, as in Sections 2 and 3. Thus,
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the operation of the attack, which in general may be stochastic, is thought of as a channel. Denoting
the channel output marginal by Q(z) =
∑
y PX(y)Wn(z|y), the analysis of this case is, in principle, the
same as before.
Assuming, for example, thatQ is memoryless (which is the case when both PX andWn are memoryless,
i.e., Wn(z|y) =
∏n
i=1W (zi|yi) for some discrete memoryless channel W : A → A), then Λ∗ is as in
Section 2, except that PX , Y , and y should be replaced by Q, Z and z, respectively. The optimal
embedder then becomes
f∗n(x,u) = argmin{y: de(x,y)≤nDe}
∑
z∈Λc∗
Wn(z|y), (52)
for the redefined version of Λc∗ which is given by:
Λc∗ =
{
z : lnQ(z) + nHˆzu(Z|U) + nλ− |A| ln(n+ 1) > 0
}
(53)
=
{
z : −nIˆzu(Z;U)− nD
(
Pˆz‖Q
)
+ nλ− |A| ln(n+ 1) > 0
}
, (54)
where Pˆz is the empirical distribution of z. Evidently, eq. (52) is not a convenient formula to work with.
Therefore, let us try to simplify (52). For a given y, let us rewrite (52) as follows:
∑
z∈Λc∗
Wn(z|y) =
∑
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
∑
z′∈T (z|y,u)
Wn(z
′|y)
=
∑
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
∣∣T (z|y,u)∣∣Wn(z|y) . (55)
It is easy to show that for a given z′ ∈ T (z|y,u) and a memoryless channel Wn(z|y), the probability of
z′ given y is given by the following expression:
Wn(z
′|y) = e−n
h
Hˆyz (Z|Y )+
P
a∈A Pˆy (a)D
(
Pˆyz (Z|Y=a)‖W (Z|Y=a)
)i
. (56)
Using the fact that the cardinality of T (z|y,u) is given by
|T (z|y,u)| .= enHˆuyz(Z|Y,U), (57)
we conclude that f∗n(x,u) ∈ T ∗(y|x,u), where T ∗(y|x,u) corresponds to the following conditional em-
pirical distribution:
Pˆ ∗uxy(Y |X,U) = arg max
Pˆuxy(Y |X,U):
Eˆxyde(X,Y )≤De
{
min
Pˆuyz (Z|Y,U):
Iˆuz (Z;U)+D(Pˆz‖Q)≤λ
[
Iˆuyz(Z;U |Y )
+
∑
a∈A
Pˆy(a)D
(
Pˆyz(Z|Y = a)
∥∥W (Z|Y = a))]
}
(58)
i.e., for a given u and x, we search for the empirical distribution Pˆuxy(Y |X,U) which maximizes the
exponent of the false negative probability dictated by the dominating conditional type T (z|y,u) in Λc∗.
Once the optimal empirical distribution Pˆ ∗uxy(Y |X,U) has been found, it does not matter which vector
y is chosen from the corresponding conditional type T ∗(y|x,u).
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6 General Attack Channel
In this section we extend the results of the previous sections to include general attack channels subject
to a distortion criterion.
Consider a covertext sequence x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn emitted from a memoryless source PX as
before. Let da : Y × Z → IR+ denote another bounded single-letter distortion measure. An attacker
subject to distortion level Da w.r.t. da is a channel Wn, fed by a stegotext y and which produces a
forgery z such that
da(y, z)
△
=
n∑
i=1
da(yi, zi) ≤ nDa ∀(y, z) ∈ A×A. (59)
We denote the set of attack channels which satisfy (59) by Wn(Da).
For a given u, we would like to devise a decision rule that partitions the space An of sequences {z},
observed by the detector, into two complementary regions, Λ and Λc, such that for z ∈ Λ, we decide
in favor of H1 (watermark u is present) and for z ∈ Λc, we decide in favor of H0 (watermark absent:
y = x). Consider the Neyman-Pearson criterion of minimizing the worst-case false negative probability
Pfn
△
= max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfn
(
fn,Λ,Wn
)
(60)
where
Pfn
(
fn,Λ,Wn
) △
=
∑
z∈Λc

 ∑
y∈An

 ∑
x:fn(x,u)=y
PX(x)

Wn(z|y)

 , (61)
and PX(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi), subject to the following constraints:
(1) The distortion between x and y does not exceed nDe.
(2) The false positive probability is upper bounded by
Pfp
∆
= max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfp
(
Λ,Wn
) ≤ e−nλ , (62)
where λ > 0 is a prescribed constant and
Pfp
(
Λ,Wn
) △
=
∑
z∈Λ

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)Wn(z|y)

 . (63)
In other words, we would like to choose an embedder fn and a decision region Λ so as to minimize Pfn
subject to a distortion constraint (between the covertext and the stegotext) and the constraint that the
exponential decay rate of Pfp would be at least as large as λ, for any attack channel in Wn(Da).
Similarly as in Section 2, we focus on the class of detectors which base their decisions on the empirical
joint distribution of z and u.
6.1 Strongly Exchangeable Attack Channels
First, we restrict the set of attack channels to be strongly exchangeable channels (the exact definition will
be given in the sequel). Later, this restriction will be dropped, and the attack channel will be allowed to
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be any member of Wn(Da). However, in this case random watermarks (rather than deterministic ones)
must be considered.
The use of strongly exchangeable channels in the context of general attack channels was proposed in
[22], where Somekh-Baruch and Merhav showed (in another context) that the worst strongly exchangeable
attack channel is as bad as the worst general attack channel, while strongly exchangeable channels are
much easier to analyze. In the sequel, we will adjust the proof technique proposed in [22] to fit our needs.
Definition 1. A strongly exchangeable channel Wn is one that satisfies for all y ∈ An, z ∈ An
Wn(z
′|y′) =Wn(z|y), ∀(y′, z′) ∈ T (y, z) .
Denote the set of all strongly exchangeable channels that operate on n-tuples by Cexn and letWexn (Da) =
Wn(Da) ∩ Cexn .
Define
W ∗n(z|y) =
cn(y)
|T (z|y)|1 {da(y, z) ≤ nDa} , (64)
where, cn(y) =
[∑
z:da(y,z)≤nDa
1
|T (z|y)|
]−1
[22, p. 543]. Clearly, W ∗n ∈ Wexn (Da). Note that cn(y)
equals to the reciprocal of the number of conditional types T (z|y) such that da(y, z) ≤ nDa [22, p. 543]
which implies that (n+ 1)−A
2 ≤ c(y) ≤ 1. Hence, cn(y) is at most polynomial in n.
Define
Λ∗ =
{
z : Iˆzu(Z;U) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX) ≥ |A| ln(n+ 1)
n
+ λ
}
. (65)
Lemma 2. (i) For every Wn ∈ Wexn (Da),
Pfp(Λ∗,Wn) ≤ e−n(λ−δn)
where limn→∞ δn = 0.
(ii) For any Λ ⊆ An that satisfies
Pfp(Λ,Wn) ≤ e−nλ′ ∀Wn ∈ Wexn (Da)
for some λ′ > λ, then Λc∗ ⊆ Λc for all sufficiently large n.
Proof. Let T (z|u) ⊆ Λ. Then, we have
e−nλ ≥ max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfp(Λ,Wn)
= max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
∑
z∈Λ

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)Wn(z|y)


≥
∑
z∈Λ

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)W
∗
n (z|y)


=
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ
∑
z′∈T (z|u)

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)W
∗
n (z
′|y)


=
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ
∑
z′∈T (z|u)
Q∗(z′) , (66)
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where Q∗(z)
△
=
∑
y∈An PX(y)W
∗
n(z|y). Now,
Q∗(z) =
∑
y∈An
PX(y)W
∗
n(z|y)
=
∑
T (y|z)⊂An
∑
y′∈T (y|z)
PX(y
′)W ∗n (z|y′)
=
∑
T (y|z)⊂An
∑
y′∈T (y|z)
PX(y
′)
cn(y
′)
|T (z|y)|1{da(y
′, z) ≤ nDa}
.
=
∑
T (y|z)⊂An
|T (y|z)|e−n
h
Hˆy (Y )+D(Pˆy‖PX)
i
e
−nHˆyz (Z|Y )cn(y)1{da(y, z) ≤ nDa}
.
=
∑
T (y|z)⊂An
e
−n
h
Hˆy (Y )+D(Pˆy‖PX )−Hˆyz (Y |Z)+Hˆyz(Z|Y )
i
cn(y)1{da(y, z) ≤ nDa}
.
= exp
{
−n
[
Hˆz(Z) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
]}
, (67)
where the last equality stems from the fact that cn(y) is polynomial in n.
Clearly, for any z′ ∈ T (z) the following holds
Q(z) =
∑
y∈An
PX(y)Wn(z|y)
=
∑
π(y)
PX(π(y))Wn(π(z)|π(y))
= Q(π(z))
= Q(z′) , (68)
where the second equality is because Wn ∈ Wexn (Da) and π(·) is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such that
z′ = π(z). Hence Q∗(z′) = Q∗(z) ∀z′ ∈ T (z). Following (66), we get
e−nλ ≥
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ
|T (z|u)|Q∗(z)
≥ |T (z|u)|Q∗(z)
≥ |T (z|u)| exp
{
−n
[
Hˆz(Z) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
]}
≥ exp
{
−n
[
Hˆz(Z)− nHˆzu(Z|U) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
]}
(n+ 1)−|A|
= exp
{
−n
[
Iˆzu(Z;U) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
]}
(n+ 1)−|A| . (69)
In the same spirit as in the attack-free scenario, we have shown that every T (z|u) in Λ is also in Λ∗.
Therefore, Λc∗ ⊆ Λc and so the probability of Λc∗ is smaller than the probability of Λc, i.e., Λc∗ minimizes
Pfn among all Λ
c corresponding to detectors that satisfy (62). It remains to show that Λ∗ itself has a
false positive exponent which is at least as large as λ for sufficiently large n.
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Clearly, for any attack channel Wn ∈ Wexn (Da),
Wn(z|y) =
∑
z′∈T (z|y)Wn(z
′|y)
|T (z|y)|
=
W
(
T (z|y)|y)
|T (z|y)|
≤ 1|T (z|y)|1{da(y, z) ≤ nDa} , (70)
where the first equality is because Wn(z
′|y) = Wn(z|y) ∀z′ ∈ T (z|y). Moreover, similarly as in (67),
combined with the fact that c(y) is polynomial in n implies that
∑
y∈An
PX(y)
1
{
da(y, z
′) ≤ nDa
}
|T (z′|y)|
.
= exp
{
−n
[
Hˆz(Z) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
]}
. (71)
Using (70) and (71), it follows that Λ∗ indeed fulfills the false-positive constraint for any attack channel
Wn ∈ Wexn (Da):
max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfp(Λ∗,Wn) = max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
∑
z∈Λ∗

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)Wn(z|y)


≤
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ∗
∑
z′∈T (z|u)

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)
1
{
da(y, z
′) ≤ nDa
}
|T (z′|y)|


=
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ∗
∑
z′∈T (z|u)
[
exp
{
−n
(
Hˆz(Z) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
)}]
=
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ∗
enHˆuz (Z|U)
[
exp
{
−n
(
Hˆz(Z) + min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
)}]
·≤
∑
T (z|u)⊆Λ∗
exp
{
−nIˆuz(Z;U)
}
exp
{
−n min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)
}
≤ (n+ 1)|A|e−nλ
.
= e−n(λ−δn) , (72)
where δn =
|A| ln(n+1)
n → 0 as n→∞.
Our next step is to find an embedder which minimizes the probability of false negative under the
given decision region for any attack channelsWn ∈ Wexn (Da). Following Section 5, the optimal embedder
can be written as follows:
f∗n(x,u) = arg miny:de(x,y)≤nDe
max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
∑
z∈Λc∗
Wn(z|y) . (73)
Lemma 3. For any attack channel Wn ∈ Wexn (Da), the optimal embedder f∗n which minimizes the
false-negative probability can be expressed in the following manner:
f∗n(x,u) = y, y ∈ T ∗(y|x,u) (74)
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where T ∗(y|x,u) corresponds to the following conditional empirical distribution:
Pˆuxy(Y |X,U) = arg max
Pˆuxy(Y |X,U):
Eˆxyde(X,Y )≤De
{
min
Pˆuyz (Z|Y,U):
Iˆuz (Z;U)+minPˆy (Y ):Eˆyda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX)<λ
Iˆuyz(Z;U |Y )
}
.
(75)
Proof. For a given y ∈ An,
max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
∑
z∈Λc∗
Wn(z|y) = max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
∑
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
∑
z′∈T (z|y,u)
Wn(z|y)
≤
∑
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
∑
z′∈T (z|y,u)
|T (z|y)|−11{da(y, z′) ≤ nDa}
≤
∑
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
|T (z|y,u)| · |T (z|y)|−11{da(y, z′) ≤ nDa}
.
= max
T (z|y,u)⊆Λc∗
e
−nIˆuyz(Z;U|Y ) . (76)
Therefore f∗n(x,u) ∈ T ∗(y|x,u), where T ∗(y|x,u) corresponds to the conditional empirical distribution
(75).
Note that the optimal embedder and the optimal decision rule correspond to the case where the
detector and the embedder are tuned to the worst possible channel W ∗n . To extend the above results
to general attack channels (i.e., channels that are members of Wn(Da) rather than Wexn (Da)) we must
consider the random watermark setting (cf. Subsection 3.4). The reason for this will be made clear in
the sequel.
6.2 Random Watermarks and General Attack Channels
In the spirit of Subsection 3.4, from this point on, we will use the model in which u is random as well,
in particular, being drawn from another source PU , independently of x, normally, the binary symmetric
source (BSS). In this case, the decision regions Λ and Λc will be defined as subsets of An × Bn and the
probabilities of error Pfn and Pfp will be defined, again, as the corresponding summations of products
PX(x)PU (u).
The corresponding version of Λ∗, proposed for strongly exchangeable attack, channels would be:
Λ∗∗
△
=
{
(z,u) : Iˆzu(Z;U) +D
(
Pˆu‖PU
)
+ min
Pˆy :Eˆyzda(Y,Z)≤Da
D(Pˆy‖PX) ≥ |A| ln(n+ 1)
n
+ λ
}
. (77)
Theorem 5. (i) For every Wn ∈ Wn(Da),
Pfp(Λ∗∗,Wn) ≤ e−n(λ−δn) ,
where limn→∞ δn = 0.
(ii) For any Λ ⊆ An × Bn that satisfies
Pfp(Λ,Wn) ≤ e−nλ′ ∀Wn ∈ Wn(Da)
for some λ′ > λ, then Λc∗∗ ⊆ Λc for all sufficiently large n.
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To prove the above theorem in the case of general attack channels, we first need to ensure that the
probability of false positive under Λ∗∗ will be smaller than e−nλ for any attack channel inWn(Da). We
use an argument, which was used in [22, Lemma 4], to prove that the worst strongly exchangeable attack
channel is as bad as the worst general channel, and therefore we can reuse the results of Lemma 2. For
the sake of completeness, we will rephrase the argument and adjust it to our problem.
Proof. Given a general attack channel Wn ∈ Wn(Da), let π denote a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and let
Wπn (z|y) △=Wn
(
π(z)|π(y)). Clearly,
W˜n(z|y) = 1
n!
∑
π
Wπn (z|y)
is a strongly exchangeable channel. For a given Wn ∈ Wn(Da), let the false-positive probability under Λ
be
Pfp(Λ,Wn)
△
=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z∈Λ(u)

 ∑
y∈An
PX(y)Wn(z|y)

 , (78)
where Λ(u) =
{
z : (z,u) ∈ Λ}. Recall that any decision region Λ is a union of joint type classes{
T (u, z)
}
. Since Pfp(Λ,Wn) is affine in Wn, we can see that
1
n!
∑
π
Pfp(Λ,W
π
n ) =
1
n!
∑
π
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z∈Λ(u)

∑
y
PX(y)W
π
n (z|y)


=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z∈Λ(u)

∑
y
PX(y)
(
1
n!
∑
π
Wπn (z|y)
)
= Pfp
(
Λ,
1
n!
∑
π
Wπn
)
. (79)
Now, for a given permutation π,
Pfp(Λ,W
π
n ) =
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z∈Λ(u)

∑
y
PX(y)Wn
(
π(z)|π(y))


=
∑
u
PU
(
π(u)
) ∑
z∈Λ(π(u))

∑
y
PX
(
π(y)
)
Wn
(
π(z)|π(y))


=
∑
u
PU (u)
∑
z∈Λ(u)

∑
y
PX(y)Wn(z|y)


= Pfp(Λ,Wn) (80)
where the second equality follows since z ∈ Λ(u)⇒ π(z) ∈ Λ(π(u)) (and that is because Λ is a union of
joint type classes {T (u, z)}) and the third equality follows from the fact that PX and PU are memoryless
which implies that PX
(
π(y)
)
= PX(y) and PU
(
π(y)
)
= PU (y).
26
From (79) and (80), we get that for any Λ,
Pfp
(
Λ,
1
n!
∑
π
Wπn
)
=
1
n!
∑
π
Pfp(Λ,W
π
n )
=
1
n!
∑
π
Pfp(Λ,Wn)
= Pfp(Λ,Wn) . (81)
Therefore, for any Λ,
max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfp(Wn,Λ) = max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfp(Wn,Λ) . (82)
Hence, the worst general attack channel is not worse than the worst strongly exchangeable channel, and
therefore we can confine our search to the set of strongly exchangeable channels under which Λ∗∗, defined
in (77), is optimal. Using a similar proof of Lemma 2, it is easy to show that indeed under Λ∗∗ the
false-positive probability is not greater than exp
{− n(λ− δn)}, where limn→∞ δn = 0.
Note that the summation over u (and the fact that any Λ is a union of types) enabled us the use of this
argument, which might suggest that for a deterministic watermark, a general attack channel is worse than
the worst strongly exchangeable channel. However, this channel might be dependent on the watermark
sequence which is not available to the attacker. This is exactly the reason why random watermark setting
is considered in the general attack scenario.
Once again, it is easy to verify that Λ∗∗ does not violate the false-positive probability constraint under
general attack channel while minimizing the false-negative probability.
We now proceed to find the optimal embedder. The false-negative probability for a given attack
channel Wn, embedder fn, and decision region Λ can be written as follow
Pfn
(
fn,Λ,Wn
)
=
∑
u∈Bn
PU (u)Pfn
(
fn,Λ(u),Wn
)
, (83)
where
Pfn
(
fn,Λ(u),Wn
)
=
∑
z∈Λc(u)
∑
y∈An

 ∑
x:fn(x,u)=y
PX(x)

Wn(z|y) . (84)
Corollary 2. For any attack channel Wn ∈ Wn(Da), the optimal embedder f∗∗n which minimizes the
false-negative probability is the embedder defined in (74).
Proof. Clearly, for any u ∈ Bn
min
fn(x,u):
de(x,y)≤nDe
max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfn(fn,Λ∗∗(u),Wn) ≥ min
fn(x,u):
de(x,y)≤nDe
max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfn(fn,Λ∗∗(u),Wn)
= max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfn(f
∗
n,Λ∗∗(u),Wn) , (85)
but on the other hand
min
fn(x,u):
de(x,y)≤nDe
max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfn(fn,Λ∗∗,Wn) ≤ max
Wn∈Wn(Da)
Pfn(f
∗
n,Λ∗∗,Wn)
= max
Wn∈Wexn (Da)
Pfn(f
∗
n,Λ∗∗,Wn) , (86)
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where the last equality can easily be obtained from the above argument when applied to embedders
which use a certain conditional type T (y|x,u) to produce the stegotext (as f∗n). Therefore, the optimal
embedder in the case of a general attack channel is f∗n, proposed in Theorem 3.
Note that from (74), (77) the false-negative error exponent can be expressed in a closed form using
the method of types [27].
6.3 Discussion
In this section, we extended the basic setup presented in Section 2 to the case of general attack channels.
First, we solved the problem for the case where the watermark sequence is deterministic under strongly
exchangeable channels. Then, we treated the case of general attack channels, but, we had to assume
that the watermark sequence u is random too. However, this should not surprise us. Clearly, for a given
watermark, the worst attack channel is dependent on the watermark (although it is not known to the
attacker). In this case, the attacker can imitate the detector operation: first, it decides which hypothesis
is more likely (using a similar decision rule used by the detector). Then, it can try to “push” the stegotext
in the wrong direction causing a false detection. A similar behavior can be seen in the case of a random
watermark message u and a deterministic covertext sequence x. If de = da and Da ≥ De, the worst
channel (which does depend on the covertext x) is the following: if y 6= x (hypothesis H1) then z = x,
i.e., the channel completely erases the message, otherwise (hypothesis H0) the channel tries to “push” y
to Λ. In this case, both the false-negative probability and the false-positive probability might converge
to one. The reason for that is rooted in the fact that the set of attack channels has not been limited. In
Subsection 6.1, we restricted the class of attack channels to be a strongly exchangeable channel and got
non-trivial results. Other limitations may be imposed on the attack channels (e.g., blockwise memoryless,
finite-state channels) if meaningful results ought to be obtained.
Note that the worst attack strategy W ∗n is independent of λ, the covertext distribution PX , and
even the embedder strategy and its distortion level De (assuming that the embedder use a certain type
T (y|x,u) to produce the stegotext). The attack strategy is only dependent on the allowable distortion
level Da. Therefore, the embedding strategy can be designed assuming that the worst attack channel
is present. This can be useful in evaluating the performance (in terms of false-negative probability) of
suboptimal embedders.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we explore the case where a = 0, i.e., y = bu. Substituting a = 0 in the
constraint of eq. (32), we get that b2− 2ρb+(α2−De) ≤ 0. The fact that b is a real number implies that
the discriminant of (b2−2ρb+(α2−De)) is non-negative which leads to ρ2−(α2−De) ≥ 0, orD ≥ α2−ρ2.
This corresponds to the case where the stegotext includes only a fraction of u without violating the
distortion constraint. In this case, the false-negative probability is zero (the distortion constraint is so
loose, it allows to “erase” the covertext). In the following case, we can choose b∗ = ρ +
√
ρ2 − α2 +D
as the optimal solution. From now on, we assume that De < α
2 − ρ2 which means that a = 0 is not a
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legitimate solution. Let us assume that ρ ≥ 0. Define t △= b/a, and rewrite (32) by dividing the numerator
and denominator by a2:
max
t∈R
f(t)
subject to: a2t2 + 2(a− 1)aρt+ (a− 1)2α2 ≤ D (A-1)
where
f(t) =
(t+ ρ)2
(t+ ρ)2 + (α2 − ρ2) .
It is easy to show that maximizing f(t) is equivalent to maximizing t. Since t is a real number, the
discriminant of
[
a2t2 + 2(a− 1)aρt+ (a− 1)2α2 −D] must be non-negative, i.e.,
∆ = 4a2
[
D − (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)] ≥ 0 , (A-2)
which leads to
1−
√
De
α2 − ρ2 ≤ a ≤ 1 +
√
De
α2 − ρ2 . (A-3)
Hence, a must be in the range R
△
=
[
1−
√
De
α2−ρ2 , 1 +
√
De
α2−ρ2
]
. Let us rewrite the constraint as follows,
[at+ (a− 1)ρ]2 + (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)−D ≤ 0 , (A-4)
consequently,
(1− a)ρ−√De − (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)
a
≤ t ≤ (1 − a)ρ+
√
De − (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)
a
. (A-5)
Our next step will be to maximize the upper bound on t in the allowable range of a.
argmax
a∈R
t(a) (A-6)
where
t(a) =
(1− a)ρ+√De − (a− 1)2(α2 − ρ2)
a
. (A-7)
After differentiating with respect to a and equating to zero, we get
a1,2 =
(α2 − ρ2)(α2 −De)±
√
Dρ2
√
(α2 − ρ2)(α2 −De)
α2(α2 − ρ2) . (A-8)
Accordingly, the optimal value of a and b are
(a∗, b∗) =
(
argmax
{
t(a)|a ∈ {a1, a2, a3, a4}
⋂
R
}
, a∗ · t(a∗)
)
, (A-9)
where a3,4 = 1±
√
De
α2−ρ2 . The same results are obtained in the case where ρ < 0.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is easy to show that under H1
ρˆ2uy =
(|ρ|+√De)2(|ρ|+√De)2 + (α2 − ρ2) , (A-10)
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where α2 and ρ are functions of the random vector X. By conditioning on α2, we can express the
false-negative probability as
Pfn =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
{
ρˆ2uy ≤ 1− e−2λ
∣∣∣ H1, α2 = r} · pα2(r)dr, (A-11)
where (nα2/σ2) is χ2 distributed with n degrees of freedom and the probability density function for the
χ2 distribution with n degrees of freedom is given by
pχ2n(z) =
(1/2)n/2
Γ(n/2)
zn/2−1e−n/2, z ≥ 0 ,
and Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function. Now, given α2, De and a threshold value τ △= 1− e−2λ, let us find
the range of ρ for which ρˆ2uy ≤ τ , i.e.,
ρˆ2uy(ρ)
△
=
(|ρ|+√De)2
(|ρ|+√De)2 + (α2 − ρ2)
≤ τ . (A-12)
The function ρˆ2uy(ρ) is symmetric with respect to the ρ axis, monotonically increasing in |ρ| and attains
its minimum value DeDe+α2 at ρ = 0. Hence, for α
2 < De(1−τ)τ , ρˆ
2
uy is greater than τ . After solving
(A-12) with respect to ρ and using the fact that τ ≤ 1, we get that |ρˆuy | ≤ √τ implies that |ρ| ≤√
De(τ − 1) +
√
Deτ2 + τα2 − τD as long as α2 ≥ De(1−τ)τ . Define
Θ(r)
△
= arccos
[√
De(τ − 1) +
√
Deτ2 + τr − τD√
r
]
(A-13)
It follows that
Pr
{
ρˆ2uy ≤ τ
∣∣∣ H1, α2 = r} = Pr
{
ρ2 ≤
[√
De(τ − 1) +
√
Deτ2 + τα2 − τD
]2 ∣∣∣ H1, α2 = r
}
= 1− Pr
{
ρ2 >
[√
De(τ − 1) +
√
Deτ2 + τα2 − τD
]2 ∣∣∣ H1, α2 = r
}
= 1− 2An
(
Θ(r)
)
An(π)
,
where
An
(
Θ(r)
)
An(π)
.
= en ln sin
(
Θ(r)
)
.
We note that Pr
{
ρˆ2uy ≤ τ
∣∣H1, α2} = 0 for α2 in the range [0, De(1−τ)τ ]. Therefore,
P
(n)
fn =
(1/2)n/2
Γ(n/2)
∫ ∞
De(1−τ)
τ
[
1− en ln sin
(
Θ(r)
)]
e−
nr
2σ2
(
nr
σ2
)n−2
2
dr
=
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
[∫ ∞
De(1−τ)
τ
σ2
r
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr −
∫ ∞
De(1−τ)
τ
en ln sinΘ(r)e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
]
.
(A-14)
Our next step is to evaluate the exponential decay rate of (A-14). It is easy to see that the first integral
of (A-14) has a slower exponential decay rate and therefore dictates the overall decay rate. To evaluate
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the exponential decay rate of P
(n)
fn as n→∞ we use Laplace’s method for integrals 5. Therefore, we need
to find the slowest exponential decay rate of the integrant in the limits of the integral. It is easy to show
that
lim
n→∞
1
n
ln
[
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
]
=
1
2
, (A-15)
and therefore the overall exponent is given by
Esefn(τ,De) = min
r≥De(1−τ)τ
1
2
[
r
σ2
− ln(r/σ2)− 1
]
. (A-16)
The function g(r) =
[
r/σ2 − ln(r/σ2) − 1], r ∈ (0,∞) achieves its minimum at r = σ2 and g(σ2) = 0.
Therefore, in the case where De(1−τ)τ ≤ σ2, Esefn(τ,De) = 0. Otherwise, the minimum of (A-16) is
obtained at r = De(1−τ)τ . Hence, the false-negative exponent of the sign embedder is given by
Esefn(τ,De) =
{
0 , De(1−τ)τ ≤ σ2
1
2
[
De(1−τ)
τσ2 − ln
(
De(1−τ)
τσ2
)
− 1
]
, else
(A-17)
Setting τ = 1− e−2λ achieves (41).
Proof of Corollary 1. Since the false-negative probability of the improved embedder (42) is zero for α2 ≤
De we can rewrite the integral (A-14) for the case where
1−τ
τ ≤ 1 (or λ ≥ 1/2 ln2) where the lower limit
equals to De (and does not depend on λ) as following:
P
(n)
fn =
(1/2)n/2
Γ(n/2)
∫ ∞
De
[
1− en ln sin
(
Θ(r)
)]
e−
nr
2σ2
(
nr
σ2
)n−2
2
dr . (A-18)
Optimizing using Laplace method as done in the proof of Theorem 3 leads to (43).
Proof of Theorem 4. Given λ > 0, the false-negative probability is given by
Pfn = Pr
{
ρˆuy ≤
√
1− e−2λ∣∣H1} , (A-19)
where the normalized correlation, under H1, is given by
ρˆuy =
ρ+
√
De√
α2 + 2
√
Deρ+D
< T . (A-20)
The function ρˆuy(ρ) achieves its minimum at ρ = − α2√De . Since ρ ∈ [−α, α] we conclude that in the case
where α2 ≥ De, ρˆuy < T implies that ρ <
√
De(T
2− 1) + T√α2 −D(1 − T 2) (ρˆuy(ρ) is monotonically
increasing in ρ, and ρˆuy(−α) = −1). If (1− T 2)D ≤ α2 < De, ρˆuy < T implies that√
De(T
2 − 1)− T
√
α2 −D(1− T 2) ≤ ρ ≤
√
De(T
2 − 1) + T
√
α2 −D(1− T 2) .
5 Laplace’s method is a general technique for obtaining the asymptotic behavior of integrals of the form I(x) =R b
a
f(t)exΦ(t)dt as x → ∞. In this case c ∈ [a, b], the maximum of Φ(t) in the interval [a, b], dictates the asymptotic
behavior of the integral (assuming that f(c) 6= 0), or in the above case:
lim
n→∞
−
1
n
ln
»Z b
a
f(t)e−nΦ(t)dt
–
= min
t∈[a,b]
Φ(t) .
See [34, Sec. 6.4], [35, Ch.4] for more information.
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Otherwise, for α2 < (1− T 2)De, ρˆuy ≥ T for all ρ ∈ [−α, α]. Define
Ψ1(r)
△
= arccos
[√
De(T
2 − 1) + T√r −D(1 − T 2)√
r
]
, (A-21)
Ψ2(r)
△
= arccos
[√
De(T
2 − 1)− T√r −D(1 − T 2)√
r
]
. (A-22)
We need to pay attention to the point r0 =
De(1−T 2)
T 2 in which Ψ1(r0) = π/2. Beyond that point
(r > r0), the probability of false-negative given α
2 = r goes to one as n tends to infinity. Therefore, the
false-negative probability can be written as follows: In the case where 1−T
2
T 2 > 1 (or λ <
1
2 ln(2))
P
(n)
fn =
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
[∫ De
De(1−T 2)
σ2
r
(
en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
− en ln sin
(
Ψ2(r)
))
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
+
∫ De(1−T2)
T2
De
σ2
r
en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
+
∫ ∞
De(1−T2)
T2
σ2
r
(
1− en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
))
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
]
.
(A-23)
The first integral in (A-23) represents the false-negative probability when both Ψ1(r) and Ψ2(r) are
greater than π/2. In this case, we need to subtract the areas of two caps, i.e., An(π−Ψ1(r))−An(π−Ψ2(r))An(π) .
The second integral in (A-23) stems from the fact that for r ≥ De the false-negative probability (given
α2 = r) equals to An(π−Ψ1(r))A(π) . The last integral in (A-23) stems from the fact that the false-negative
probability (given α2 = r) equals to 1 − A(Ψ1(r))A(π) . In a similar way, in the case where 1−T
2
T 2 ≤ 1 (or
λ ≥ 12 ln(2))
P
(n)
fn =
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
[∫ De(1−T2)
T2
De(1−T 2)
σ2
r
(
en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
− en ln sin
(
Ψ2(r)
))
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
+
∫ De
De(1−T2)
T2
σ2
r
(
1− en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
− en ln sin
(
Ψ2(r)
))
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
+
∫ ∞
De
σ2
r
(
1− en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
))
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
]
.
(A-24)
Since we are interested in the exponential decay rate (to the first order), the slowest exponent dictates
the overall exponential behavior. Therefore, the fact that sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
> sin
(
Ψ2(r)
)
for De(1−T 2) ≤ r ≤
D(1− T 2)/T 2 implies that
Pfn
.
=
(1/2)
n
2 n
n−2
2
Γ(n/2)
[∫ De(1−T2)
T2
De(1−T 2)
σ2
r
en ln sin
(
Ψ1(r)
)
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
+
∫ ∞
De(1−T2)
T2
σ2
r
e−
nr
2σ2 e
n
2 ln(r/σ
2)dr
]
.
(A-25)
Again, using the Laplace’s method for integrals [35, Ch.4] we can conclude that
Eaefn(T,De) = min
{
E1(T,De), E2(T,De)
}
, (A-26)
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where,
E1(T,De) = min
De(1−T 2)<r≤De(1−T2)
T2
1
2
[
r
σ2
− ln
( r
σ2
)
− 2 ln sin (Ψ1(r)) − 1
]
, (A-27)
E2(T,De) = min
r>
De(1−T2)
T2
1
2
[
r
σ2
− ln
( r
σ2
)
− 1
]
. (A-28)
E2(T,De) is given by
E2(T,De) =
{
0 , De(1−T
2)
T 2 ≤ σ2
1
2
[
De(1−T 2)
T 2σ2 − ln
(
De(1−T 2)
T 2σ2
)
− 1
]
, else
. (A-29)
Since T 2 = 1 − e−2λ, then E2(λ,De) = Esefn(λ,De) and therefore Eaefn(λ,De) ≤ Esefn(λ,De). Our next
step will be to prove that E1(T,De) < E2(T,De) when
De(1−T 2)
T 2 > σ
2 (otherwise, Eaefn(T,De) = 0).
Define
f(r) =
r
2σ2
− 1
2
ln
( r
σ2
)
− ln sin (Ψ1(r)) − 1
2
(A-30)
f(r) is a continuous, non-negative function in the range De(1− T 2) < r ≤ De(1−T
2)
T 2 . Clearly,
E1(T,De) ≤ f
(
De(1− T 2)
T 2
)
= E2(T,De). (A-31)
In addition, f ′(r) is continuous in the above range. It can easily be shown that
f ′
(
De(1 − T 2)
T 2
)
=
1
2
[
1− T
2σ2
De(1 − T 2)
]
> 0 (A-32)
hence, f(r) is monotonically increasing in small neighborhood of De(1−T
2)
T 2 , and therefore E1(T,De) <
E2(T,De). This fact leads to the conclusion that E
ae
fn(λ,De) < E
se
fn(λ,De). The exact value of E1(T,De)
is cumbersome and therefore will not be presented.
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